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there is wage dispersion between and within the two worker groups, but all wage differences 
become negligible when the taste for discrimination is small. We analyze the effect of an 
equal-pay policy, both in combination with affirmative action and without. When equal 
opportunity of hiring cannot be enforced, wage dispersion increases and wages for minority 
workers fall substantially relative to laissez faire. Sometimes also the wage gap between 
worker groups widens in response to the policy. 
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 1 Introduction
There are persistent wage gaps between demographic groups that cannot be related
to observable productivity diﬀerences. Many researchers and policy makers attribute
such gaps to discriminatory behavior of employers. It is therefore not surprising that
several countries have implemented legislation to combat discrimination in the labor
market. In principle two types of equal–treatment policies can be distinguished.
There are equal pay laws, demanding equal remuneration for equal work, and there
are equal employment opportunity laws, covering hiring and promotion practices.
But even in the United States, where such legislation has been introduced more
than forty years ago, considerable earning gaps between races and genders remain,
and the evidence on the impact of equal–treatment policy on inequality is mixed.1
This paper analyzes the eﬀectiveness of equal–treatment policy in a search model
where a wage diﬀerential between two groups of equally productive workers arises
due to a discriminatory taste of a fraction of employers. Prejudice on the side of
employers (or co–workers/customers) is one of the two prominent theoretical ex-
planations for labor market discrimination which goes back to Becker (1957).2 It
is a well known result that taste–based discrimination can only occur temporar-
ily but not permanently if all goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive
(see e.g. Cain (1986)). In light of such ﬁndings, one may be tempted to conclude
that there is no need for policy combating discrimination; to the contrary, market
deregulation alone will be enough to throw discriminating employers out of business.
Yet, today there is broad agreement between labor economists that the competi-
tive, frictionless model is inadequate to deal with many labor market phenomena,
such as unemployment and wage dispersion. Search and matching models are the
most common alternative (see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for a recent
1Exploiting state–level variation in anti–discrimination statutes, Neumark and Stock (2001)
show that there is no evidence of a positive eﬀect of equal–treatment legislation on relative earnings
of black males, although there seems to be a modest positive eﬀect on the earnings of black females
relative to white males.
2The other is statistical discrimination (Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973)) which is not considered
here.
1overview), and these models have also been used to address discrimination; see the
literature overview below. However, although wage gaps between equally produc-
tive workers can persist in frictional labor markets, policy conclusions are far from
obvious. Conventional wisdom suggests the usual trade–oﬀ between equality and
eﬃciency, so that it is up to the political preferences of society to decide the ap-
propriate strength of anti–discrimination enforcement. In this paper, we argue that
this intuition can go wrong: in many circumstances equal–pay policy can both harm
equality and eﬃciency.
We consider a Burdett and Judd (1983) model of the labor market, with two groups
of workers (A and B) and two types of ﬁrms, some with a discriminatory taste
against type B workers. Without policy intervention, the equilibrium exhibits a
positive wage gap between the two worker groups and there is also within–group
wage dispersion. By assuming that each worker sends several applications, we ensure
that inequality is negligible if the disutility taste is small. In fact, our model gives
rise to the perfectly competitive (Bertrand) outcome in the absence of discriminatory
behavior, but to non–competitive outcomes otherwise. We then discuss two types
of equal–treatment legislation. On the one hand, there is an equal–pay law (EPL)
which requires that any ﬁrm pays the same wage to its workers (who are all employed
in the same occupation). We assume throughout that this policy can be enforced
perfectly. On the other hand, there is an equal employment opportunity law (EEOL)
which requires that any ﬁrm’s workforce must represent the population shares of the
two worker groups suﬃciently.3 Here we contrast two opposite scenarios. In the ﬁrst,
EEOL can be perfectly enforced. Unsurprisingly, in such situations the combination
of the two policy measures reduces the wage gap to zero, although some within–
group wage dispersion still remains.
The other scenario is the complete absence of EEOL, or, equivalently, the impossibil-
ity to enforce such legislation. Certainly, in practice there are enforcement problems
for both equal–pay and equal–employment laws. The policy regime where EPL op-
3In the U.S., EPL is embodied in the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and EEOL is formulated in
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), established in 1965.
2erates eﬀectively and EEOL does not is clearly an abstraction; it reﬂects the view
that equality of employment opportunities is perhaps more diﬃcult to enforce than
equality of pay within the same ﬁrm. Indeed, non–compliant behavior is hard to
monitor and punish; private ﬁrms can easily decide not to invite unfavored job ap-
plicants for an interview without being charged with violation of EEOL. Aﬃrmative
action and employment quotas are, if at all, applied to a small segment of the labor
market only, such as public employers or government contractors.4 There is also di-
rect evidence of hiring discrimination from ﬁeld experiments, which further supports
the view that enforcement of equal employment opportunity is far from perfect.5
The main result of this paper is that the combination of EPL without perfect en-
forcement of EEOL increases inequality dramatically; relative to laissez faire, wage
dispersion unambiguously increases and mean wages for minority workers generally
fall. Because also wages for majority workers are lower, the eﬀect on the mean wage
gap between the two worker groups is ambiguous. Nevertheless, we also demonstrate
that the wage gap can even increase in reaction to equal pay policy, particularly in
labor markets where the number of minority workers is low and the number of
discriminating employers is large. The intuition for the adverse policy impact on
inequality is as follows. Some discriminating employers who are not allowed to dis-
criminate in pay decide to discriminate in hiring. Hence minority workers receive
fewer job oﬀers, so that their labor supply becomes less elastic than the labor sup-
ply of majority workers. In turn, the ﬁrms’ wage competition becomes less ﬁerce,
wage–oﬀer distributions shift to the left, with a support that is much larger than
under laissez faire. We also ﬁnd that not all discriminating ﬁrms discriminate in
hiring: there are high–wage ﬁrms who reject minority applicants but at the same
4In the U.S., all ﬁrms with more than 100 employees are required to submit employment reports
to the EEOC who is authorized to initiate lawsuits on the basis of underrepresentation of minorities.
However, such lawsuits are rare (Holzer and Neumark (2000)), and ﬁrms who want to discriminate
against some group (e.g. black males) can easily circumvent the EEOC requirements by hiring
more members of another protected group (e.g. white females). For evidence on this last issue, see
Bisping and Fain (2000).
5For the U.S., see e.g. the audit study of Neumark et al. (1996) and the correspondence test of
Bertrand and Mullainnathan (2004). See also the survey of Riach and Rich (2002).
3time low–wage ﬁrms who hire them despite their distaste.
There are other contributions exploring discrimination in search models. In the
model of Black (1995), minority workers receive lower wages because it is assumed
that these workers do not receive job oﬀers from discriminating employers. In con-
trast, in our model employment discrimination does not occur under laissez faire;
it is the endogenous equilibrium response to the equal–pay policy, and there are
also discriminating ﬁrms who make wage oﬀers to minority workers, albeit at low
wages. Closely related to our model is Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) who consider
taste discrimination in a Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model of the labor mar-
ket, both with and without equal–pay legislation. They also show that this policy
does not eliminate wage gaps, but again they assume that minority workers are dis-
criminated in hiring, uniformly across all disutility ﬁrms. Our model, in contrast,
derives hiring strategies endogenously and they are not uniform across ﬁrms. In
contrast to these wage–posting models, Rosen (2003) considers a model with wage
bargaining and ﬁnds that discriminating ﬁrms can achieve higher proﬁts than non–
discriminating ﬁrms, thus arguing that discriminating employers are more likely to
survive in the long run. In our model, as in the others discussed above, this is not the
case: discriminating employers earn lower proﬁts than nondiscriminating employers.
Nevertheless, we show that discriminators’ proﬁts can increase in response to the
policy. Finally, Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005) consider a model where search
is directed rather than random. Assuming that ﬁrms cannot discriminate in pay, a
non–negligible wage gap arises even when the disutility taste is arbitrarily small. In
their model, all ﬁrms have discriminatory preferences, ranking majority applicants
before minority applicants. Minority workers do not apply to ﬁrms posting high
wages where hiring chances are very low since only these jobs attract majority ap-
plicants. In equilibrium, thus, complete market segregation arises. However, ﬁrms
rarely post wages publicly in the real world, and although segregation is a prevalent
phenomenon, it is far from perfect.6
6Shi (2006) also discusses between–group wage inequality in a directed search framework. He
argues that actual wage diﬀerentials among similar workers may not be a valid indicator of dis-
crimination. What really matters are expected wages which include job–ﬁnding chances.
4Of course our paper is not the ﬁrst pointing at adverse impacts of equal–treatment
policies. Welch (1976) argues that equal–treatment policy entails allocative eﬃ-
ciency losses, but this is little surprising given that there are no frictions in his
model. On the other hand, Lundberg and Startz (1983) show that in a model of sta-
tistical discrimination, an equal–pay policy can raise welfare by inducing minority
workers to invest more in their human capital. By contrast, Coate and Loury (1993)
argue that aﬃrmative–action policies do not necessarily promote equality because
of a patronization problem: protected workers anticipate that their employment
chances are good even if they do not invest in productive skills. Our mechanism is
much more basic; it simply describes the labor market response to equal–treatment
policy, abstracting from any long–run eﬀects on human capital investment.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the model. Section 3 derives equilibrium without policy regulation, and Section
4 discusses the scenario where equal pay policy is combined with strict aﬃrmative
action. Section 5 considers the eﬀect of an equal–pay policy when equal opportunity
of employment cannot be enforced. Section 6 analyzes the policy impact on mean
wages and on the wage gap in numerical examples. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a Burdett and Judd (1983) model of the labor market, with heteroge-
nous workers and with a discriminatory taste disturbing the preferences of some
employers. There is a continuum [0,1] of workers divided into two types; fraction
(1 − σ) are type A and fraction σ are type B workers. Both worker types are non–
negligible, i.e. σ ∈ (0,1). When employed, all workers have the same productivity
p > 0 and the reservation wage is common to all workers and normalized to zero.
There is a large number N of ﬁrms, each of which can hire an arbitrary number of
workers to produce output p per worker. Fraction λ of ﬁrms are “disutility ﬁrms”
7Kaas (2009) ﬁnds similar eﬀects of equal–pay policy in a spatial labor market model of monop-
sonistic competition.
5who derive linear disutility d for every B worker in their workforce. These ﬁrms
maximize proﬁt net of disutility from B employment. The disutility taste is low
enough so that these ﬁrms are willing to hire B workers at a suﬃciently low wage;
that is, d < p. The remaining (1 − λ)N ﬁrms are conventional proﬁt maximizers;
they are indiﬀerent between hiring A or B workers. We assume that N is such a
large number that each ﬁrm, regardless of its type, perceives (approximately) that
a fraction λ of its competitors are again disutility ﬁrms. Importantly, although each
ﬁrm is small relative to its competitors, it is large relative to workers; particularly,
each ﬁrm ends up employing an inﬁnity of workers.
In the absence of policy regulation (laissez faire), the sequence of events is as follows.
Stage I Every worker applies at exactly 1+m random ﬁrms, where 1 ≤ m ≪ N is
exogenously given.
Stage II Every ﬁrm j oﬀers jobs at wage w
j




Stage III Workers accept the best oﬀer as long as the oﬀer is at least as high as
their zero reservation wage. If a worker has two or more equal oﬀers, he accepts any
of them with the same chance.
Four remarks are in order. First, although ﬁrms oﬀer wages after workers apply, this
framework is equivalent to one where ﬁrms commit to wages before the application
stage and where search is random, as is the case in Burdett and Judd (1983). Second,
the ﬁrms’ wage policies are restricted to rule out within–group wage discrimination.
This is not a critical requirement. Even if ﬁrms were allowed to wage discriminate
between workers of the same type, they need not exercise this option.8 Third, the
8Although it may happen that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between several wage oﬀers, the assump-
tion that there is no within–ﬁrm wage dispersion (among workers of the same type) restricts the
equilibrium set only trivially. All wage dispersion, if any, happens across ﬁrms in this model. This
is also in line with the empirical regularity that most wage dispersion is between ﬁrms rather than
within ﬁrms.
6assumption that each worker sends 1 + m ≪ N applications (rather than applying
at all ﬁrms) captures the search frictions in this model which eventually gives rise to
non–competitive wages. Note that when all workers and jobs are identical (which is
the case when d = 0 or σ = 0 or λ = 0), two or more applications are enough to yield
the perfectly competitive outcome through Bertrand wage competition.9 Otherwise,
however, ﬁrms can exercise market power, wages for B workers diﬀer from their
marginal product, and there is wage dispersion. Fourth, the actual number N turns
out to be irrelevant for equilibrium since there are no capacity constraints at any
ﬁrm.Instead, the appropriate measure of the strength of competition in this model
is the number of applications per worker. Indeed, it is reasonable to imagine that
1 + m increases proportionately with the number of active ﬁrms.10
At the second stage, ﬁrms maximize their payoﬀ by setting wages for A workers and
B workers respectively, taking the wage oﬀer distributions of competitors as given.
The payoﬀ of a nondisutility ﬁrm oﬀering wages (wA,wB) is simply its proﬁt
(p − wA)l
A(wA) + (p − wB)l
B(wB) ,
where ls(ws) is labor supply of type s = A,B workers to a particular ﬁrm oﬀering
wage ws. The payoﬀ of a disutility ﬁrm oﬀering (wA,wB) is proﬁt minus linear
disutility of B employment:
(p − wA)l
A(wA) + (p − d − wB)l
B(wB) .
Since search is random, the number of applications of workers of a given type at
any ﬁrm is the same. Consequently, expected employment of A (or B) workers only
depends on the wage oﬀer but is independent of the ﬁrm type. Let F s
d(ws) and
F s
n(ws) denote the cumulative wage oﬀer distributions to workers of type s = A,B
9This is Lemma 2(ii) of Burdett and Judd (1983). If workers would send only one application
with positive probability less than one, there would be wage dispersion even with homogenous
workers.
10For example, think of a spatial model where workers live in an area of size L and that each
worker applies at all ﬁrms in a region of size εL around his home. If ﬁrms are uniformly distributed
across area L, each worker applies at 1 + m ≈ εN ﬁrms.
7by disutility and nondisutility ﬁrms, respectively. Then employment levels of A and
B workers at a ﬁrm oﬀering (wA,wB) are11
l





















For example, in the ﬁrst equation,
(1+m)(1−σ)
N is the mass of A workers applying
at a particular ﬁrm, and the expression [.]m is the share of these applicants whose
remaining m oﬀers are all not larger than wA.
3 Laissez–faire equilibrium
Since ﬁrms’ payoﬀs are separable in the two employment types, stage–II wage com-
petition can be solved separately for A and B workers.
Each A worker sends at least two applications and thus gets several wage oﬀers
from equally productive ﬁrms. Therefore, ﬁrms bid up wage oﬀers to the workers’
marginal product. The unique equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution is the degenerate
distribution that has all mass concentrated at wA = p (Bertrand equilibrium).12
Clearly, the wage oﬀer distribution function for B workers diﬀers from the one for A
workers, since some ﬁrms derive a disutility taste when employing B workers. While
disutility ﬁrms bid wage oﬀers up to their “eﬀective” marginal product p − d, the
full wage oﬀer distribution does not degenerate at that value. Nondisutility ﬁrms
realize that some of their B applicants obtain all other oﬀers from disutility ﬁrms
at w = p − d while other B applicants obtain oﬀers from nondisutility ﬁrms that
can proﬁtably hire this worker at higher wages. Hence nondisutility ﬁrms face a
trade–oﬀ between low wage costs and higher recruitment rates which gives rise to
11For simplicity, all distribution functions in these expressions are continuous. Whenever there
are mass points, the employment terms must be altered according to stage III randomization
between equal oﬀers.
12It is trivial that the competitive wage is an equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 2(ii)
of Burdett and Judd (1983).
8wage dispersion, as in the static model of Burdett and Judd (1983), or in dynamic
models with search–on–the–job like Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
Since the wage oﬀer distribution F B
d degenerates at p−d, the lower bound of distri-
bution F B
n must be equal to p − d: no nondisutility ﬁrm will attract any worker by
oﬀering w < p − d; and if the lower bound of the support of F B
n was at w > p − d,
the ﬁrm oﬀering w would hire the same number of B workers at lower cost at wage
oﬀer w − ε > p − d. On the other hand, no nondisutility ﬁrm will exactly oﬀer
p − d since it can attract share λm/(1 + m) of all B applicants at this wage (share
mλm/(1 + m) of them will go to a disutility ﬁrm oﬀering the same wage and share
1 − λm go to a nondisutility ﬁrm oﬀering a higher wage), whilst it hires at least
share λm of all B applicants at any slightly larger wage. In other words, the payoﬀ
function of nondisutility ﬁrms jumps upwards at w = p − d. Using standard argu-
ments, one can also show that the distribution of wage oﬀers of nondisutility ﬁrms
cannot have mass points and must be strictly increasing. Hence the support of F B
n
is a connected, half–open interval (p − d,wB].
To ﬁnd the equilibrium distribution, we make use of the indiﬀerence condition which
states that any wage w ∈ (p−d,wB] yields the same expected payoﬀ as a wage oﬀer
arbitrarily close to, but above p − d:
(p−w)l







= [p−(p−d)](1 + m)σ
N λ
m .













which has upper bound wB = p − dλm. Hence, the market wage oﬀer distribution
















, w ∈ [p − d,p − dλm]
(1)
Proposition 1: Under laissez–faire, the unique equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution
for A workers degenerates at w = p. The wage oﬀer distribution for B workers is
9non–degenerate with support [p − d,p − dλm] and cumulative distribution (1). All
B workers earn lower wages than A workers. A disutility ﬁrm obtains zero payoﬀ
and positive proﬁt σdλm/N, and a nondisutility ﬁrm earns proﬁt (1 + m)σdλm/N.
Every nondisutility ﬁrm employs more B workers than any disutility ﬁrm.
In contrast to a perfectly competitive labor market, a discriminatory taste of some
ﬁrms together with search frictions aﬀects the shape of the wage oﬀer distributions
which exhibits both between–group and within–group (group B only) wage disper-
sion. Note however that all wage dispersion disappears in the limit d → 0. Another
“competitive limit” obtains when m → ∞. Although the wage–oﬀer distribution is
still non–degenerate in the limit (it has mass points at p−d and at p), the earnings
distribution is not: all B workers are employed at nondisutility ﬁrms at wage w = p.
As in Becker’s model, segregation eliminates any wage diﬀerentials in a competitive
labor market.
4 Equal pay with strict aﬃrmative action
Suppose now the government imposes an equal–pay law that prohibits wage diﬀeren-
tials in identical occupations within the same ﬁrm. Suppose furthermore that there
is a perfectly enforceable equal–employment–opportunity law which stipulates that
each ﬁrm must employ at least as many B workers in relation to its A workers as
corresponds to the relative population share. Alternatively, the law regulates that
the B–A ratio of new hires is not lower than this ratio in the ﬁrm’s application pool.
But this second requirement is identical to the ﬁrst in the random search environ-
ment of this model. In any case, the legislation prescribes that the ratio between B
and A employment in any ﬁrm may not fall short of σ/(1 − σ).13
Under this policy regime, each ﬁrm can oﬀer only one wage to both types of workers
and it cannot reject any B applicant whenever it hires all its A applicants. Formally,
13A more general policy would be the requirement that each ﬁrm respects the constraint ℓB/ℓA ≥
γσ/(1−σ) with some γ ∈ [0,1] measuring the strength of aﬃrmative action. This section considers
the extreme γ = 1, whilst the next section focuses on the absence of aﬃrmative action where γ = 0.
10the second stage of our model is altered as follows.
Stage II Every ﬁrm decides a common wage w for all its workers. It may oﬀer this
wage to as many applicants as it wants, but the ratio between B and A workers may
not fall short of σ/(1 − σ).
Clearly, a nondisutility ﬁrm hires all applicants at any wage w < p. If a disutility
ﬁrm hires ℓ workers at wage w, its payoﬀ is (p − σd − w)ℓ since fraction σ of its
workers must be of type B. Hence, a disutility ﬁrm decides to hire all applicants at
any wage w < p − σd, but it is unwilling to hire any worker at a wage w > p − σd.
Put diﬀerently, p−σd is the marginal payoﬀ of an additional worker for a disutility
ﬁrm in this policy regime. We assume that disutility ﬁrms hire all applicants at
wage w = p−σd, although they are indiﬀerent between all legal hiring strategies at
this wage.
Similar to the laissez–faire case, there is again perfect wage competition between
disutility ﬁrms who bid their wage oﬀers up to their eﬀective marginal product
p − σd. On the other hand, the wage oﬀer distribution of nondisutility ﬁrms does
not degenerate. The positive probability that an applicant gets all other oﬀers from
disutility ﬁrms at p−σd gives these ﬁrms some market power, so that they randomize
wages from a common distribution whose lower bound is at p − σd.
In the mixed–strategy equilibrium, nondisutility ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between any
wage w in the support of the wage oﬀer distribution and a wage arbitrarily close to
the lower bound p − σd:
(p−w)[l
A(w)+l





= [p−(p−σd)]1 + m
N λ
m .










whose upper bound is p−dσλm. The market wage oﬀer distribution, i.e. the fraction












, w ∈ [p − dσ,p − dσλm] .
(2)
Comparison with (1) shows that the wage–oﬀer distribution ﬁrst–order stochastically
dominates the distribution for B workers under laissez–faire. Therefore, the mean
wage for B workers is higher while the mean wage for A workers is lower under the
policy. Obviously, the wage diﬀerential between the diﬀerent demographic groups is
totally eliminated. Perhaps surprisingly, proﬁts for all ﬁrms are unchanged relative
to laissez–faire.
Proposition 2: Under the equal–pay policy with strict aﬃrmative action, the equi-
librium wage oﬀer distribution has support [p−σd,p−σdλm] and cumulative distribu-
tion (2) which stochastically dominates wage oﬀers for B workers under laissez–faire.
Mean wages for A and B workers are equalized. Disutility ﬁrms obtain zero payoﬀ
and positive proﬁt σdλm/N, and nondisutility ﬁrms earn proﬁt (1+m)σdλm/N, the
same as under laissez–faire.
5 Equal pay without aﬃrmative action
When combined with strict aﬃrmative action, equal–pay legislation succeeds in
eliminating wage diﬀerences between worker groups. However, such an ideal result
obtains only if the employers are not allowed to discriminate in hiring by rejecting
less attractive job applicants. That is, equal opportunity of employment must be
perfectly enforced. As we have argued in the introduction, there are several reasons
why this may not be the case. We thus explore the situation where equal–pay policy
works eﬀectively while hiring discrimination cannot be prohibited. The key question
is whether the policy is still eﬀective in lowering wage inequality and raising wages
for B workers. We now have
Stage II Every ﬁrm decides a common wage w for all its workers. It may oﬀer this
12wage to as many applicants as it wants.
In this alternative policy scenario, a disutility ﬁrm decides to hire all applicants
at any wage oﬀer w < p − d but it rejects all B applicants at any wage oﬀer
w > p − d. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of Proposition 2 cannot be
sustained anymore. Particularly, at their equilibrium wage oﬀer p−σd, all disutility
ﬁrms would reject as many B applicants as possible. This also implies that there
must be hiring discrimination in equilibrium, i.e. some disutility ﬁrms must oﬀer
wages w > p − d and reject B workers. For if this was not the case, hiring behavior
would be the same as in the previous section; ﬁerce wage competition would set in
again so that, at some point, all ﬁrms will oﬀer wages above p − d which, in turn,
must induce disutility ﬁrms to reject B applicants.
Since some B applications get rejected, all ﬁrms gain market power and are inclined
to change their pay policy; anticipating that some workers do not obtain another
oﬀer, they are able to attract at least a few B workers by merely oﬀering the reser-
vation wage. Indeed, in stark contrast to our previous results, the lower bound of
the wage oﬀer distribution is now at zero.
Because the possibility of hiring discrimination aﬀects B workers only, labor supply
of B workers to any ﬁrm is generally less elastic than labor supply of A workers.
For this reason, a nondisutility ﬁrm oﬀers a lower wage than a disutility ﬁrm who
oﬀers w > p − d and attempts to hire only A workers whose labor supply is more
elastic. Indeed, it turns out that the highest wages are oﬀered by disutility ﬁrms
that hire only A workers. Sometimes, however, a fraction of disutility ﬁrms do not
reject B workers and oﬀers wages which are even lower than the wages oﬀered by
nondisutility ﬁrms. This is intuitively easy to explain: the marginal payoﬀ of an
additional worker is larger at a nondisutility ﬁrm than at a disutility ﬁrm that hires
all workers. These results can be formally stated in the following Lemma which is
proven in the Appendix.
Lemma: Let F = λFd + (1 − λ)Fn be the equilibrium distribution of wage oﬀers.
Then F is strictly increasing and continuous (that is, there are no holes and no
13mass points) and the lower bound of the support is at the workers’ reservation wage
of zero. Moreover, for any wn in the support of Fn and wi
d, i = 1,2, in the support
of Fd such that w1
d ≤ p − d < w2
d, it holds that w1
d ≤ wn ≤ w2
d.
From this Lemma follows that equilibrium can be described as follows. There are
wage thresholds 0 ≤ w0 ≤ p − d < w1 < w < p and a number   ∈ [0,1) such that:
1. Fraction   of disutility ﬁrms make low wage oﬀers, drawn from distribution
F l
d with support [0,w0]. These ﬁrms hire all applicants.
2. Nondisutility ﬁrms draw wage oﬀers from distribution Fn which has support
[w0,w1], and they hire all applicants.
3. Fraction 1−  of disutility ﬁrms make high wage oﬀers, drawn from distribution
F h
d with support [w1,w]. These ﬁrms hire only A applicants.
In the Appendix (proof of Proposition 3) we characterize the equilibrium wage–oﬀer
distribution. For given  , one can derive F and the critical wage thresholds from
bottom to top, using standard indiﬀerence conditions. At the end, the fraction   is
pinned down to ensure that disutility ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between oﬀering wages in
the lower or in the upper wage range. We ﬁnd that   is positive if, and only if,
d < d
∗ ≡ pσ
σ + (1 − σ)(1 − λ)
m .
When the disutility parameter is larger than d∗, no disutility ﬁrm oﬀers low wages,
in which case   = 0 and w0 = 0. On the other hand, it always holds that   < 1;
there must be some disutility ﬁrms rejecting B applicants, as has been explained
above.
Figure 1 shows the wage–oﬀer density in a numerical example where p = 1, d = .1,
σ = λ = .5 and m = 1. Here the critical wage thresholds are w0 ≈ .897, w1 = .95
and w ≈ .953. Fraction 1−  ≈ 10.5% of disutility ﬁrms set high wages w ∈ [w1,w],
rejecting B workers. Hence, in this example, the chance that a B worker ends up
without a job–oﬀer is merely (λ(1 −  ))2 ≈ 0.27%.
14Figure 1: The equilibrium wage–oﬀer density for parameters p = 1, d = .1, λ = σ =
.5, m = 1. About 89.5% of disutility ﬁrms oﬀer wages w ∈ [0,.897] and 10.5% of
them oﬀer wages w ∈ [.95,.953], rejecting B workers.
Relative to the outcomes under laissez faire and under strict enforcement of pay and
hiring equality, wage dispersion is much larger in this policy regime. In the absence
of hiring discrimination, no ﬁrm is willing to oﬀer wages below w = p − d (under
laissez faire) or below w = p−σd (under equal pay with aﬃrmative action). With a
reasonably small disutility taste parameter, wage dispersion is small since all wages
are close to marginal product. Without enforcement of hiring equality, however,
there are always ﬁrms who oﬀer much lower wages and the support of the wage oﬀer
distribution is larger, certainly so when d ≤ p/2.14
Although overall wage dispersion increases, it is analytically intractable to answer
what happens to the mean wages of workers in the two groups and to the wage
gap between A and B workers, although it is obvious that a positive wage gap
14Nevertheless, in the limit d → 0 the wage oﬀer distribution converges to the Dirac distribution
at w = p. Although the support of F is still the full interval [0,w] with w → p, the variance
becomes arbitrarily small in this limit.
15must remain. The next section sheds light on these questions with a few numerical
examples. On the other hand, it is possible to show that payoﬀs of all ﬁrms are
always higher than under laissez faire. And obviously, total welfare is reduced since
some B workers do not ﬁnd employment in this labor market.
Proposition 3: Under the equal–pay policy without aﬃrmative action, a fraction
1 −   > 0 of disutility ﬁrms rejects all B workers and oﬀers wages in some interval
[w1,w]. Provided that d < d∗, there is also a positive fraction   of disutility ﬁrms
oﬀering wages w ∈ [0,w0] who employ all workers. Nondisutility ﬁrms oﬀer wages
in the range [w0,w1] where w0 > 0 iﬀ d < d∗. Provided that d ≤ p/2, the support
of the wage oﬀer distribution is larger than under laissez–faire or under equal pay
with equal opportunity of employment. Payoﬀs of all ﬁrms are higher than under
laissez–faire.
6 Mean wages and the wage gap
In this section we analyze numerically whether the equal pay policy is eﬀective in
lowering wage inequality and raising wages for B workers. We also examine how
the eﬀectiveness of policy depends on the relative shares of minority workers and
of disutility ﬁrms and on the degree of competition, as measured by m. If policy
would magnify wage inequality between diﬀerent demographic groups or reduce
wages for B workers under certain conditions, policy makers should be more cautious
to implement it.
In all numerical examples, we normalize workers’ productivity to p = 1 and we
choose a reasonably small value of the disutility taste parameter at d = .1. In
the Appendix we show how mean earnings can be calculated under laissez faire
and under equal pay. If a B worker happens to send all applications to high–wage
disutility ﬁrms rejecting him, we assume that this worker still ﬁnds employment
in an outside labor market at his zero reservation wage. The alternative would be
to treat these workers as unemployed; this would give rise to a higher conditional
16mean wage for employed B workers which, however, would not adequately reﬂect
their impaired employment perspectives.
For the benchmark parameters of Figure 1, mean wages for the two worker groups
are E(wA) ≈ .92 and E(wB) = .908, so the wage gap is about 1.25%. Compared
with the laissez–faire outcome where E(wA) = 1 and E(wB) = .925, the wage gap
under the equal–pay policy is reduced to about one sixth. Nevertheless B workers
are worse oﬀ, earning lower wages than under laissez faire. The standard deviations
of earnings are reasonably low at σ(wA) = 4.3% and σ(wB) = 6.0%. Although
the support of the wage–oﬀer distribution is larger for A workers, the standard
deviation of earnings is higher for B workers since some of them end up earning a
zero wage whereas the wage–oﬀer distribution is skewed to the left. Under laissez
faire, standard deviations are σ(wA) = 0 and σ(wB) = 1.85%. Hence both workers
not only earn lower wages, they also face much higher income uncertainty.
To explore the role of parameters, Figure 2 shows what happens to mean earnings
when σ and λ are varied from their benchmark at σ = λ = .5. For all parameters, B
workers earn lower wages on average under the policy than under laissez faire. The
left graph shows that the wage gap nearly vanishes when the share of B workers
is large. In fact, in the limit σ → 1, the common wage oﬀer distribution under
equal pay converges to the laissez–faire wage–oﬀer distribution for B workers. In
the opposite situation of a small share of B workers, however, the wage gap between
A and B workers widens substantially. The intuition is that wage competition for
A workers becomes ﬁercer when the share of A workers increases, so A workers gain
when their relative number increases. B workers lose however since more disutility
ﬁrms decide to reject B applicants at high wages (  falls) so that a larger share of B
workers do not ﬁnd a job in this labor market and earn their zero reservation wage.
When σ is below .15, the wage gap under the equal pay policy is larger than under
laissez faire. The right graph shows that wages for all workers fall under the policy
when the share of disutility ﬁrms increases. Also the wage gap widens in this case,
both under laissez faire and under the equal–pay policy.
A complete overview of the impact of σ and λ on the wage gap and on earnings for
B workers is provided in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) demonstrates that the policy often
17Figure 2: Mean earnings for A workers (blue) and B workers (red) under laissez
faire (solid) and equal pay (dashed) as λ and σ are varied (all other parameters as
in Figure 1).
does not succeed in reducing the wage gap between A and B workers. Moreover,
its eﬀectiveness is closely related to the proportion of minority workers and that
of disutility ﬁrms in the market. If less than 20% of all workers are type B and a
majority of ﬁrms have a disutility taste against these workers, the policy increases
the wage gap. Nevertheless, for a large set of parameter constellations, the policy
reduces the wage gap between A and B workers. However, what ultimately matters
for discriminated workers is not the wage gap per se, but the policy impact on their
expected earnings. To this end, Figure 3(b) shows the diﬀerence between the mean
wage of B workers under laissez faire and under the equal–pay policy, again for dif-
ferent parameter conﬁgurations of σ and λ. The mean wage of B workers is always
reduced by the equal pay policy. Particularly, if the market is made up of less B
workers and more disutility ﬁrms, the mean wage of minority workers falls substan-
tially. Hence, our model predicts that if the labor market has a small proportion of
minority workers and a large proportion of disutility ﬁrms, equal pay policy alone
18cannot be a good strategy from both the aspects of eﬃciency and equality. On the
one hand, eﬃciency is impaired by the regulation. Without the policy regulation,
all workers are employed by some ﬁrm with productivity p, but after the introduc-
tion of equal pay legislation, some B workers do not ﬁnd employment but rather
receive their reservation wage income (either in unemployment or in an outside labor
market). On the other hand, wage inequality is increased by the policy. Not only
can the wage gap increase, but mean wages of discriminated workers are reduced by
the policy. Within–group wage dispersion also increases substantially. Hence both
equality and eﬃciency are harmed by equal–pay policy.
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Figure 3: (a) Reduction of the wage gap under the policy (negative if wage gap
increases, with red < 0, blue 0 − 0.05, purple 0.05 − 0.1). (b) Reduction of mean
earnings of B workers (yellow 0 − 0.05, blue 0.05 − 0.2, red > 0.2). All other
parameters are as in Figure 1.
Finally, we explore what happens to mean wages when the labor market is more
“competitive” in the sense that the number of applications per worker increases. As
we have argued before (footnote 10), a larger number of active ﬁrms increases the
number of suitable job openings for each worker and so is likely to raise the number
of applications. It is straightforward to show that all workers earn w = p in the limit
19m → ∞. Under laissez faire, the wage–oﬀer distribution for B workers degenerates
at the two values w = p − d (oﬀered by disutility ﬁrms) and w = p (oﬀered by
nondisutility ﬁrms). All B workers are however employed by nondisutility ﬁrms in
the limit. Under equal–pay policy, the wage–oﬀer distribution again degenerates
when m → ∞:   → λ/(1 + λ) disutility ﬁrms oﬀer w = p − d, and all other
disutility ﬁrms and nondisutility ﬁrms oﬀer w = p. All workers again earn w = p
in the limit. Figure 4 conﬁrms that mean earnings of all workers approach p = 1
when the number of applications is increased from 1 + m = 2 to 1 + m = 8. For
these benchmark parameters, the wage gap is always reduced but nevertheless B
workers lose on average under the policy. The reduction of the wage gap is largest
at lower values of m; that is, equal–pay policy is more eﬀective in reducing the wage
gap when the labor market is less competitive. In more competitive labor markets,
however, the policy impact on the wage gap is negligible.
Figure 4: Mean earnings for A workers (blue) and B workers (red) under laissez faire
(solid) and equal pay (dashed) as m is increased (all other parameters as in Figure
1).
207 Conclusion
The literature on labor search and discrimination has been successful in explaining
the persistence of between–group wage diﬀerentials, but remains rather silent about
policy implications. This paper sheds light on the impact of equal pay legislation in
combination with and without aﬃrmative action policy on the wage diﬀerential in
the labor market. In a random search model with taste–based discrimination, it is
shown that equal–pay policy is often not helpful in promoting wage equality. The
key results of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• Under laissez faire, the existence of a discriminatory taste generates both
between-group and within-group wage dispersion. Nevertheless, wage inequal-
ity is minor if the disutility parameter is small.
• If equal–pay legislation is supported by a strict aﬃrmative action program, the
policy succeeds in perfectly eliminating the wage diﬀerential between the two
groups of workers. Within–group wage dispersion remains however. There is
no negative impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts or on welfare.
• In contrast, if aﬃrmative action is not applicable, the policy causes discrimina-
tory practices in hiring of some or all discriminators, which raises all employers’
market power. Overall wage dispersion is ampliﬁed, even when the disutility
taste is small. A positive wage gap remains which can be even larger than
under laissez faire. Mean wages for minority workers are always lower. Both
discriminating and non-discriminating ﬁrms gain from the policy, but welfare
is reduced.
It is an open issue how far these policy implications extend to more general situa-
tions where the strength of aﬃrmative action varies continuously between the two
extremes discussed in this paper, as suggested in footnote 13. Whenever aﬃrmative
action is not perfect (γ < 1), some hiring discrimination must occur in equilibrium,
and some ﬁrms then attempt to hire rejected B workers at their reservation wage;
21hence the support of the wage–oﬀer distribution would again increase signiﬁcantly
under the policy.
Appendix
Proof of the Lemma:
Observe ﬁrst that disutility ﬁrms must oﬀer wages w > p−d with positive probability
(and thus reject B applicants), i.e. Fd(p − d) < 1. Otherwise there would only be a
zero mass of rejected B applicants, so hiring discrimination would be irrelevant, and
equilibrium would be as in Proposition 2, which contradicts the absence of hiring
discrimination (because of p − σd > p − d). We proceed to prove the ﬁve claims of
the Lemma sequentially.
Claim 1: F is continuous (no mass points). It is obvious that there is no mass
point at any wage w  = p−d and w  = p: If a positive mass of ﬁrms would oﬀer such
a wage, each of them could raise payoﬀ by oﬀering w + ε with ε suﬃciently small.
w = p − d also cannot be a mass point. For the same reason as above, no mass of
nondisutility ﬁrms will oﬀer this wage. And if a mass of disutility ﬁrms would oﬀer
w = p − d, they only derive positive surplus from hiring A workers but zero payoﬀ
from B workers. Again any of these ﬁrms could raise payoﬀ by oﬀering w + ε and
rejecting B applicants. Finally, no ﬁrm oﬀers w = p, since payoﬀ would be zero
whilst it is positive at w = 0 where a ﬁrm can hire at least a positive mass of B
applicants who are rejected elsewhere.
Claim 2: F is strictly increasing (i.e. the support is connected). Suppose
no ﬁrm sets a wage in the non–empty interval (w0,w1), w1 is in the support of F,
and w0 ≥ 0. Then the ﬁrm oﬀering w1 can raise payoﬀ by oﬀering w1−ε, hiring the
same number of workers at lower cost.
Claim 3: The lower bound of the support of F is zero. Suppose instead
that w > 0 is the lower bound. Then a ﬁrm oﬀering this wage can only hire those
B workers whose other m applications go to high–wage disutility ﬁrms (note that,
because of Claim 1, the chance that another oﬀer comes from a ﬁrm that also oﬀers
22w is zero). But these workers can also be hired at w = 0 at strictly higher payoﬀ.
Claim 4: Let wx be in the support of Fx, x = d,n, and let wd ≤ p−d. Then
wd ≤ wn holds. The proof is the same as in related wage dispersion models with
productivity heterogeneity. From payoﬀ maximization follows that
(p − wn)ℓ(wn) ≥ (p − wd)ℓ(wd) ,
(p − σd − wd)ℓ(wd) ≥ (p − σd − wn)ℓ(wn) ,
where ℓ(w) is employment (of A and B workers), a strictly increasing function of
the wage oﬀer w (from Claim 2). This implies that
(p − wn)ℓ(wn) ≥ (p − wd)ℓ(wd) > (p − σd − wd)ℓ(wd) ≥ (p − σd − wn)ℓ(wn) ,
from which follows that
[p − (p − σd)]ℓ(wn) ≥ [p − (p − σd)]ℓ(wd) .
Since σd > 0 and ℓ is increasing, wn ≥ wd.
Claim 5: Let wx be in the support of Fx, x = d,n, and let wd > p−d. Then
wd ≥ wn holds. Suppose instead that wd < wn. Then there are three possibilities,
all of which will lead to a contradiction.
First, there is an interval I = (wd, ˜ w) which belongs to the support of Fd and not
to the support of Fn, but ˜ w ≤ wn belongs to the support of Fn. Second, an open
interval I = (wd, ˜ w) belongs to the support of both Fn and Fd. Third, there is an
interval I = (wd, ˜ w) belonging to the support of Fn but not to the support of Fd, for
some ˜ w ≤ wn. There is no further possibility since the support of F is connected
(claim 2).
Suppose the ﬁrst possibility was true. Then, for all w ∈ I, disutility ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between oﬀering w or ˜ w (note that all payoﬀ functions are continuous
since the wage–oﬀer distribution is continuous), and they do not hire B workers, so
(p − w)ℓ
A(w) = (p − ˜ w)ℓ
A( ˜ w) .
23But then the nondisutility ﬁrm oﬀering ˜ w can do strictly better by oﬀering w ∈ I
instead:
(p − ˜ w)[ℓ
A( ˜ w) + ℓ
B( ˜ w)] = (p − w)ℓ
A(w) + (p − ˜ w)ℓ
B(˜ w)
< (p − w)ℓ
A(w) + (p − w)ℓ
B(˜ w)
= (p − w)[ℓ
A(w) + ℓ
B(w)] ,
where the last equation uses ℓB( ˜ w) = ℓB(w) because only disutility ﬁrms (who reject
B workers) oﬀer wages in I and since the mass of nondisutility ﬁrms oﬀering ˜ w is
zero (claim 1).
Second, suppose the supports of Fd and Fn overlap on some open interval I. Then,
the payoﬀ function of a disutility ﬁrm, (p − w)ℓA(w), and the one of a nondisu-
tility ﬁrm, (p − w)ℓ(w) (with ℓ(w) = ℓA(w) + ℓB(w)) are both constant (and thus
diﬀerentiable) at any w ∈ I, satisfying
ℓ(w) = (p − w)ℓ
′(w) , (3)
ℓ
A(w) = (p − w)ℓ
A′
(w) , (4)
which also implies that
ℓ
B(w) = (p − w)ℓ
B′
(w) . (5)
Labor supply of A and B workers to a ﬁrm oﬀering w > p − d is
ℓ
A(w) = (1 + m)(1 − σ)
N
 




B(w) = (1 + m)σ
N
 
λ + (1 − λ)Fn(w)
 m
. (7)
In the last equation, a B worker sends another application to a disutility ﬁrm with
probability λ. This ﬁrm either makes an oﬀer at a wage below p − d, or rejects the
worker. Thus none of these applications result in an oﬀer which is preferred to w.
Rewriting (4) and (5) using (6) and (7) yields









λ + (1 − λ)Fn(w) = (p − w)m(1 − λ)F
′
n(w) . (9)
24Subtracting (9) from (8) gives
Fd(w) − 1 = (p − w)mF
′
d(w) ,
which is a contradiction since the left–hand side is strictly negative (because w is in
the interior of I ⊂ suppFd) and the right–hand side is non–negative.
Lastly, suppose the third possibility was true. Then, for all w ∈ I = (wd, ˜ w),
nondisutility ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between oﬀering w or wd; hence (3) holds for all
w ∈ I. While labor supply of B workers to any w ∈ I is again (7), labor supply of
A workers is
ℓ
A(w) = (1 + m)(1 − σ)
N
 
λFd(wd) + (1 − λ)Fn(w)
 m
,


















xA ≡ λFd(wd) + (1 − λ)Fn(w) and xB ≡ λ + (1 − λ)Fn(w) .
From (10) and xB ≥ xA follows that
(p − w)m(1 − λ)F
′










≥ (1 − σ)xA + σxB . (11)






A(w) = −(1 − σ)x
m









− xA + (p − w)m(1 − λ)Fn
′(w)
 






= (1 − σ)σx
m−1
A λ[1 − Fd(wd)] ,
where the third line uses (11). Now there are two possible cases. Either the last
term is strictly positive which is a contradiction since then disutility ﬁrms could
25raise payoﬀ by deviating from wd to w > wd. Or the last term is zero which implies
Fd(wd) = 1. But then there must be a positive mass of disutility ﬁrms oﬀering wages
in another open interval ˆ I ⊂ (p − d,wd), so that one of the other two possibilities
above (which also lead to contradictions) must apply.
This completes the proof of the Lemma. 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider a given   (to be determined below) and consider the wage–oﬀer distribution
for low–wage disutility ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between oﬀering any wage
w ∈ [0,w0], or the zero reservation wage, at which they hire only those B applicants
who send all other applications to a high–wage disutility ﬁrm where they are rejected:
(p − d − w)(1 + m)σ
N
 











= (p − d − 0)(1 + m)σ
N
 
λ(1 −  )
 m
.
Note that in this expression, as in all the other indiﬀerence conditions below, the
terms (1 + m)/N cancel out on both sides. To save on notation, we therefore skip
these terms in all the other equations in this proof. The wage–oﬀer distribution F l
d






p − dσ − w
 
λσ(1 −  )
λ 
.
For larger values of m, F l
d is a strictly increasing and convex function, and the upper
bound is obtained from F l




σ(1 − (1 −  )





1 − (1 −  )
m
 
σ + (1 − σ) 
m . (12)
Wages in the medium range w ∈ [w0,w1] are oﬀered by nondisutility ﬁrms. Here























(1 − σ)λ  + σλ
1 − λ
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σ(1 − (λ(1 −  ))






1 − (1 −  )
m
 
σ + (1 − σ)
 
1 − λ(1 −  )
 m .
(13)
In the highest wage range [w1,w], the remaining 1 −   fraction of disutility ﬁrms
are active. Because of w1 > p − d (as we show below), they reject all B applicants,
so their indiﬀerence condition amounts to
(p − w)(1 − σ)
 









d (w) = λ  + 1 − λ
λ(1 −  )











σ + (1 − λ(1 −  ))
m(1 − σ − σλ




m(1 − λ + λ )
m(1 − (1 −  )
m)
σ + (1 − σ)(1 − λ(1 −  ))
m .
(14)
Finally, the unknown variable   follows from the requirement that payoﬀ of all
disutility ﬁrms must be the same. Provided that   ∈ (0,1), this is satisﬁed whenever
the disutility ﬁrm oﬀering w = 0 gets the same payoﬀ as the one that oﬀers w and
hires only A applicants (rejecting all B applicants):
(p − d − 0)σλ
m(1 −  )
m = (p − w)(1 − σ) .













27Clearly,   < 1 is always satisﬁed when there are some A workers (σ < 1).15 However,
the presence of disutility ﬁrms oﬀering low wages (  > 0) and hiring B workers
requires that the disutility taste parameter is not larger than d∗. When d ≥ d∗, all
disutility ﬁrms oﬀer high wages and reject B applicants who are then either hired
by a nondisutility ﬁrm or do not get a job if they happen to send all applications to
disutility employers.
It can also be conﬁrmed that the derived wage thresholds (12) and (13) are indeed
compatible with the assumed hiring behavior of disutility ﬁrms. When d ≥ d∗,
w0 = 0 and
w1 = p[σ(1 − λ
m) + (1 − σ)(1 − λ)
m]
σ + (1 − σ)(1 − λ)
m > p − d .
And when d < d∗, some algebra yields w1 = p − dλm ≥ p − d, and w0 < p − d is
equivalent to  (1 − λ) < 1 − λ which is true whenever λ < 1 (since   < 1). In the
limit λ → 1 (no nondisutility ﬁrms), both thresholds obviously collapse at w = p−d.
When workers send only two applications (m = 1), the combined market wage oﬀer
distribution F(w) = λ F l




    
    
wλσ(1 −  )
p − dσ − w ,w ∈ [0,w0] ,
λ  + (w − w0)[(1 − σ)λ  + σλ]
p − w , w ∈ [w0,w1] ,
λ  + 1 − λ + (w − w1)(1 − λ + λ )
p − w , w ∈ [w1,w] .
(16)
It remains to prove the results on ﬁrm payoﬀs and proﬁts. Suppose that d < d∗ (the
other case is similar). Consider disutility ﬁrms ﬁrst. Their payoﬀ is
U
d = (1 + m)σ
N (p − d − 0)λ
m(1 −  )
m > 0 ,
so it is greater than the zero payoﬀ under laissez faire. Proﬁts, however, diﬀer among
disutility ﬁrms: low–wage ﬁrms employ B workers so their proﬁts are larger than
proﬁts of high–wage ﬁrms that do not employ B workers. In fact, proﬁt is lowest at
πd
min = Ud at any high–wage disutility ﬁrm oﬀering w > p − d, and highest at the
15In the limit σ → 1, there is only competition for B workers, and the equilibrium distribution
converges to the one derived in Section 3 where all disutility ﬁrms oﬀer w = p − d.
28disutility ﬁrm oﬀering w = 0 where proﬁt is
π
d
max = (1 + m)σ
N pλ
m(1 −  )
m .
On the other hand, proﬁt under laissez faire is πd
LF = σλmd/N. It is straightforward
to show that there are parameters where πd
max > πd
LF > πd
min, so proﬁts of disutility
ﬁrms can be higher or lower. Now consider nondisutility ﬁrms. For d < d∗, the
highest wage they oﬀer is w1 = p − dλm, so their payoﬀ (=proﬁt) is
U








But this is clearly larger than payoﬀ (=proﬁt) under laissez faire, Un
LF = (1 +
m)σλmd/N. 2
Calculation of mean wages under laissez faire
Workers of type A face a degenerate wage oﬀer distribution that concentrates all
mass at wA = p.
B workers either send all 1 + m applications to disutility ﬁrms, in which case they
get w = p − d, or they send 1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + m applications to nondisutility ﬁrms who
oﬀer wages drawn from distribution F B
n (w) = (F B(w) − λ)/(1 − λ). Hence,
E(wB) = λ










































Calculation of mean wages under the equal–pay policy without aﬃrmative
action











29B workers earn a zero wage with probability (λ(1 −  ))1+m. Otherwise, they draw
1 ≤ k ≤ 1 + m wage oﬀers from distribution F on [0,w1]. But this is the same
as if they draw all 1 + m wage oﬀers from the cumulative distribution ˜ F(w) ≡












Arrow, K. (1973): “The Theory of Discrimination,” in Discrimination in Labor
Markets, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and A. Rees. Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, NJ.
Becker, G. (1957): The Economics of Discrimination.University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainnathan (2004): “Are Emily and Greg more
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination,” American Economic Review, 94, 991–1013.
Bisping, T., and J. Fain (2000): “Job Queues, Discrimination, and Aﬃrmative
Action,” Economic Inquiry, 38, 123–135.
Black, D. A. (1995): “Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 13, 309–334.
Bowlus, A., and Z. Eckstein (2002): “Discrimination and Skill Diﬀerences in
an Equilibrium Search Model,” International Economic Review, 43, 1309–1345.
Burdett, K., and K. Judd (1983): “Equilibrium Price Dispersion,” Economet-
rica, 51, 955–969.
Burdett, K., and D. Mortensen (1998): “Wage Diﬀerentials, Employer Size,
and Unemployment,” International Economic Review, 39, 257–273.
30Cain, G. (1986): ”The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A
Survey” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed.by O.Ashenfelter, and R. Layard.
vol.1, chap. 13 North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Coate, S., and G. Loury (1993): “Will Aﬃrmative–Action Policies Eliminate
Negative Stereotypes?,” American Economic Review, 85, 1220–1240.
Holzer, H., and D. Neumark (2000): “Assessing Aﬃrmative Action,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 38, 483–568.
Kaas, L. (2009): “Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111, 51–71.
Lang, K., M. Manove, and W. Dickens (2005): “Racial Discrimination in
Labor Markets with Posted Wage Oﬀers,” American Economic Review, 95, 1327–
1340.
Lundberg, S., and R. Startz (1983): “Private Discrimination and Social Inter-
vention in Competitive Labor Markets,” American Economic Review, 73, 340–347.
Neumark, D., R. Bank, and K. V. Nort (1996): “Sex Discrimination in Restau-
rant Hiring: An Audit Study,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 915–941.
Neumark, D., and W. Stock (2001): “The Eﬀects of Race and Sex Discrimina-
tion Laws,” NBER Working Paper 8215.
Phelps, E. (1972): “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American
Economic Review, 62, 659–661.
Riach, P., and J. Rich (2002): “Field Experiments of Discrimination in the
Market Place,” The Economic Journal, 112, F480–F518.
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2005): “Search–Theoretic Models
of the Labor Market: a Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 958–988.
Rosen, A. (2003): “Search, Bargaining, and Employer Discrimination,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 21, 807–829.
31Shi, S. (2006): “Wage Diﬀerentials, Discrimination and Eﬃciency,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 50, 849–875.
Welch, F. (1976): “Employment Quotas for Minorities,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 84, S105–S139.
32